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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an organization assessment of the army G4, (the logistics 
department of the Rwandese Patriotic Army,) using a systems framework. The purpose of 
the study was to describe the current state of the organization and to determine whether 
the G4 is bctioning efficiently and if not, then to recommend measures to improve its 
performance. Assessment results show a responsive organization struggling to cope with 
a dynamic and uncertain external environment. The organization is riddled with internal 
misfits and rigidities, all of which inhibit operational efficiency. The thesis suggests 
possible courses of action to help G4 leaders improve their service. Specific 
recommendations include: revision of the organization's mandate; specification of G4 
mission and direction; redesign to achieve more. congruence; treatment of personnel 
issues; and adoption of clear and inspiring goals with corresponding procedures for 
evaluation. Improvement efforts require active support and participation of all G4 
stakeholders. 
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The Anny G4 (Rwandese Patriotic Army Logistics Service) is in its sixth year as a 
national military logistics service. It started after the RPA defeated the national military in 
1994. To form the new national military, the RPA was re-organized to include former 
government military members who did not participate in the 1994 genocide. 
Since 1994, the new military has grown in size and has assumed more 
responsibilities. Likewise the logistics department has grown in size and operations. The 
department now faces competing demands. These demands are a result of persistently 
high security threats after the 1994 genocide, which have led to more military operations 
within and outside the country. 
More operations require more material resources and personnel who have the 
organizational and management skills to optimally deploy these resources. Unfortunately 
national resources are scarce and they limit the soldiers' rising personal expectations. All 
these issues pose a serious challenge to the Army at large and the logistics department in 
particular. 
B. PURPOSE 
Against this background, it would be useful to assess the logistics service to 
determine whether it is operating as efficiently as it can. If it is not efficient, then the 
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intention would be to determine what can be done to improve performance. Thus this 
study will answer the following questions for the Rwandese Patriotic Army Logistics 
Organization (Army G4): 
1. What is the nature of G4's current operations in terms of its direction, 
design features, culture, and Performance? 
2. 
3. 
These important and difficult questions can be best addressed and answered when 
one has a better understanding of the organization and its components. Thus, the purpose 
of this research is to provide a framework to help managers and leaders assess 
organizational performance and to identify the leverage points for organizational 
improvement. This research also aids policy makers in logistics matters to develop a more 
systematic, analytical approach to assessing their system. It benefits the logistics unit 
employees by enhancing their capacity to identify areas that degrade organizational 
performance. It also contributes to our understanding of change by showing how 
managers can gather valid data about organizational functioning and how they can use 
these data to guide the change process. By monitoring organizational indicators, 
logisticians can learn how to diagnose organizational problems and develop 
recommendations for improvement. This study offers some benefits to organizational 
stakeholders, too, by giving them ideas of what to expect from the improvements. 
How well is the organization functioning or performing? 
What can be done to improve Performance? 
2 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This research is a case study of the Army G4 (The Rwandese Patriotic Army 
Logistics Service). The case study used a number of data collection methods: 
1. 
2. 
Archival records of the G4; 
Interviews with organization officials and Ministry of Defense officials 
who deal with logistics matters; (Interviews include structured, and unstructured open- 
ended questions.(See appendix C for the interview questions). 
3. Direct observation (the author is a former employee of the organization). 
D. SCOPE OF STUDY 
The study focuses on the current state of the defense logistics unit, particularly the 
Army G4. Relevant approaches to assessment and change are addressed in Chapter II. 
Interventions for improvement where necessary and applicable are suggested in Chapter 
N. 
E. LIMITATIONS AND WEAKNESSES 
This study describes a complex and newly-emerging organization. Much of the 
data on which it relies is subjective and impressionistic. There are numerous 
organizational variables to analyze, but time and resources for research are limited. I had 
to decide what information to collect and what information to ignore during the research 
process. Therefore, the study is exploratory and descriptive at a macro level of analysis. 
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Furthermore, each of the different methods used to collect data on the operations and 
structure of the logistics department has its own strengths and weaknesses. For example, 
archival records may have problems of validity and therefore require crosschecking to 
ensure that they are not biased. Some employees may consciously provide invalid data to 
the records system, others may provide information that they feel reflects well on them 
rather than what is true. Some archival data may be hard to analyze because what 
constitutes standards of the various performance measures in organizations is not always 
clear. 
Interviews, although a valuable source of data, are also subject to biases by the 
respondents and interviewers. Answers to questions depend on how clearly the questions 
are posed and how the respondents interpret the interview questions. Again, collection, 
analysis, and interpretation of data collected are difficult activities. There is always a 
possibility of misinterpreting and biasing the data, either on the side of the respondent or 
the interviewer. 
In addition to these general observations, I must also acknowledge several 
hardships during the course of the study that will inevitably have some impact on the 
results. First, I had to rely primarily on subjective assessments (interviews and personal 
observations as a former employee of the department). I attempted to be as objective as I 
could, but my bias and perspectives undoubtedly influence the assessment. 
Second, the analysis is not as substantial as I would have preferred because of the 
limited time and resources for the research. Travel was restricted to one visit and data 
gathering was limited to interviewing five officials who deal with logistics in the Ministry 
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of Defense and the G4 service. I did not have enough time to interview other officials in 
the army logistics department and those of other military services. The following were 
interviewed: the secretary general, the director of finance, the director of planning in the 
Ministry of Defense; the Army chief of logistics (G4); and a G4 logistics officer 
responsible for research and development. 
Some types of data on force strength, size, and defense budget figures were simply 
not available. Some of the data is classified and therefore inaccessible. Some available 
information is 'filed in fragmented form where readily accessing and retrieving it is not 
possible. 
Despite these difficulties, significant amount of data were available from the 
various logistics offices, especially the G4 office. So, despite the weaknesses of the data 
collection techniques in this study, the use of multiple methods is expected to increase the 
data's validity. The strategy of using interviews, archival records, and my own 
observation can minimize the distortions and ensure greater validity. 
5 
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11. ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Various elements of OUT lives are bound up in organizations. There is much 
concern about performance of major institutions in society, such as government. The 
pressures of increased complexity, scarce resources, and rising expectations demand that 
organizations be more effective. A major question, therefore, is how to create 
organizations that better meet the expectations of individuals as well as the needs of 
society. Creating effective organizations requires the ability to assess them and 
understand what makes them function as they do. This understanding in turn implies the 
knowledge and ability to collect, understand, and apply information about organizations 
in order to improve performance. This chapter reviews the assessment process and the 
alternative approaches to diagnosing and improving organizations. 
B. WHAT IS ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT? 
Assessing an organization is collecting information from and about an 
organization, analyzing it, and then casting the information within a systemic and 
systematic framework. A good assessment will point the way toward, if not determine, 
the steps that must be taken to change and improve the organization. To assess well, one 
must know where to look and what to look for. This is where the notion of a system 
becomes important. An organization is an open system, with information and material 
7 
coming into the organization. Some of this material is used internally and part is 
transformed into organizational results going out of the system. Thus we look at the 
organization as a whole. 
Assessment is also the process of measuring or evaluating external or 
environmental factors as well as internal organizational conditions. It is a process of 
measuring the effectiveness of an organization. Effectiveness includes both the task 
performance capabilities of the organization (how well various components of the 
organization are structured and fbnction to perform tasks) and the impact of the system 
components on individual members. 
Organizational assessment often involves the following activities: data collection, 
data interpretation, and data use. As mentioned in Lawler, Naddler, and Cammann (1980) 
assessment is a systematic data collection and use drawing on valid and reliable 
instruments and techniques and conducted with healthy skepticism. 
Key measurement areas that form the domain of organization assessment 
according to Naddler (1 979) are: 
Tasks (the nature of work that is to be done); 
Individuals (the characteristics of people who make up the organization); 
Groups (the aggregated individuals to perform a range of different tasks or 
functions); 
Formal organizational structure, the formal leadership practices and various 
mechanisms for the coordination and control of individuals and groups; 
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0 Informal organization (not seen on organizational charts, but these 
relationships, structures, and processes are important because they are both the result and 
a cause of much of the individual and group behavior); 
0 Environment. (Organizations exist within and have transactions with a larger 
environment); 
0 Outputs: the nature and quality of outputs o'f the behavior system of the 
organization. 
C. WHY IS ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT SO IMPORTANT? 
Assessment is a process that tells the manager what is out of balance and what is 
functioning effectively. 
1. The process provides rational analysis of the organization's system 
integrity and helps to develop commitment for change among the power players of the 
organization when the organization is not functioning well. 
2. Furthermore, assessment allows a distinction of critical issues from other 
issues and helps us focus on the system's true leverage points rather than hunting for 
quick fix solutions. 
3. Assessment is also very important in identifjlng the leverage points for 
organizational improvement. As emphasized by Hanna (1988), it is the diagnosis that 
must precede prescription if the root causes of the ailment are to be treated. Organizations 
have many symptoms that might divert the manager's attention and time. Assessment 
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allows the organization to identify the underlying causes of its performance and when 
they are addressed can lead to meaningful improvements in the entire organization. 
D. USES OF ASSESSMENT DATA 
Assessment data are directly related to the many decisions for which they are 
used. Assessment data are very important in problem diagnoses and decisions about 
resource allocation, and job choices that have to be made in and outside organizations. 
Uses of assessment data include: 
1. Human Resource Management. Personnel Managers collect assessment 
data on counter productive behaviors like absenteeism, tardiness, and turnover and 
employee satisfaction to monitor employee productivity; 
2. Change Management. Managers collect data on the organization's results. 
If the results are poor, then, they search for changes to make in the organization's 
direction and /or design factors. 
3. Program Evaluation. Evaluators collect assessment data to determine how 
well programs are doing. They also use the data on an ongoing basis to help shape and 
improve programs. A continuous assessment helps point out where the program may be 
having problems or unintended consequences; 
4. Resource Allocation. Managers collect assessment data to help them make 
decisions on which projects to find. Programs without measurable impact or evidence of 
contribution to the organization are considered less important and therefore not financed. 
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E. ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT 
For information about the organization to become understandable and useful, it 
must be treated in organizational terms. Hence, it is necessary to look at some models and 
theories that help organize and systemize information about organizations. Some of the 
models are descriptive and others emphasize specific dimensions for assessment. Some 
emphasize technological aspects, others financial aspects, and still others look at 
informational aspects. Since this thesis is interested in understanding what people do or 
do not do in organizations, the emphasis is on behavioral oriented models. Although the 
man-machine interaction is of interest, the focus is on its consequences for the people 
involved (Burke 1987). 
All the models considered here, although different from one another, are based on 
the open-system notion of input- throughput- output, and all recognize that an 
organization exists in an environmental context. Also, they all recognize the same 
fimdamentals i.e. an organization is an open system that exists in an environment and 
consists of people and technology (Burke 1982). Three kinds of models considered here 
include "The One Best Way Models," "Contingency Models," and "The Open Systems 
Approach" to organizational assessment and change. 
1. The One Best Way Models (Normative Theories) 
Normative theorists argue that, for organization development, there is one best 
way to manage and change. Major proponents of the normative theory are Likert (1976) 
and Blake and Mouton (1968,1978). 
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a) Liked's Profiles 
This model categorizes organizations into four types: 
System 1 - autocratic, top down, exploitative management; 
System 2- benevolent autocracy; 
System 3- consultative; 
System 4- participative management. 
Likerts' approach to diagnosis is structured and directional. It is structured by use 
of his questionnaires (The Profile of Organizational Characteristics). It is directional in 
that data that are collected are compared with System 4. The survey feedback method is 
used as the main intervention; data from the questionnaire are reported back to 
organizational members. The questionnaire has six sections covering leadership, 
motivation, communication, decisions, goals, and control aspects. 
b) Blake and Mouton's Grid of Organizational Development 
Blake and Mouton argue that there is one best way to manage an 
organization. They also depend on questionnaires. In their study of the most common 
barriers to organizational effectiveness and corporate excellence, they found that 
communication was number one followed by a lack of planning. These two major barriers 
and the other less prevalent ones are symptoms of organizational problems, not causes 
according to Blake and Mouton (Burke 1982). The causes lie deeper in the system. Faulty 
planning for example is a result of an organization's not having a strategy or having a 
strategy based on unsound rationale. Communication problems derive from the nature of 
the supervision practiced in the organization. 
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Blake and Mouton developed a six-phase approach to organizational development 
that considers both the organizations' strategic plan or lack of it, and the style or approach 
to supervision and management. Organizational members should first examine 
managerial behavior and style and then develop and implement an ideal strategic 
organizational model. 
Their dimensions, which include production and people, are interdependent. Blake 
and Mouton note that leadership is impossible without both task and people. Any 
manager will have concern for accomplishing the organization's purpose like producing 
products or services, results, or profits. Also, a manager will have some degree of concern 
for the people who are involved in helping to accomplish the organization's purpose. 
2. Contingency Approach 
(Lawrence and Lorsch's Contingency Theory) Contingency advocates specify 
neither a best way to diagnose nor a particular direction for change. They emphasize 
structure and intergroup relationships in organizations. They argue that there is a cause- 
effect relationship between how well an organization's internal structure matches its 
environmental demands and how well the organization performs (the ability to 
accomplish its goals and objectives). 
The primary concepts of Lawrence and Lorsch's contingency theory are 
differentiation and integration. Within this framework, organizational diagnosis is 
conducted along these two dimensions and a series of questions are generated: 
Environmental demands: On what basis does a customer evaluate and choose 
between competing suppliers (price, quality, delivery, service etc)? What are the major 
13 
. . ... 
problems an organization encounters as it operates? Have there been changes in the past? 
And what is the current situation? 
Dzflerentiation: Regarding structure, what is the average span of control? How 
important is it to have formal rules for routing procedures and operations? How important 
are interpersonal relationships? How clear are the goals and how are they measured? In 
terms of feedback time, how long does it take for employees to know their performance? 
Integration: What is the quality of relations between units? How interdependent 
are the organization's units? 
Conflict Management: What mode of conflict resolution is used? How much 
influence do employees have on the hierarchy for solving problems and making 
decisions? 
The organizational diagnostician would be looking for the degree of match 
between environmental demands and the internal organizational structure. Lawrence and 
Lorsch stress interfaces between the organization and its environment, between and 
among units within organizations, and between individual employees and the 
organization as represented by management. 
3. Open Systems Models 
Ths  approach provides a macro view of the organization and assists leaders and 
managers in linking and discussing factors affecting organltzational performance as a 
holistic system. The systems approach allows leaders to understand how changes in one 
area affect other parts of the organization, and how strategy, structure, environment, 
processes and subsystems (i.e. decision making, rewards, and communication) affect 
14 
tool that can help managers improve organizational performance. This thesis will briefly 
discuss three examples in this open-systems category which include: 
a) Weisbord's Six-Box Model 
Weisbord depicts his model as a radar screen with "blips" that tell us about 
organizational highlights and issues both good and bad (Burke 1987) (See figure 2.0). 
Every organization is situated within an environment and, as the arrows indicate, the 
organization is influenced by and in turn has an impact on various elements of that 
environment. In Weisbord's model, the organization is represented by six boxes, which 
represent purposes, structure, rewards, helphl mechanisms, relationships, and leadership. 
For each box, the client organization should be diagnosed in terms of both its formal and 
informal systems. A key aspect of any organizational analysis is the gap between the 
formal dimensions of an organization, such as the organizational chart (the structure box), 
and its informal properties, such as how authority is actively exercised. The larger the gap 
is the more likely that the organization is hnctioning ineffectively and the narrower the 
gap the organization is likely to be hnctioning effectively. 
15 
What business are we in? 
How do we divide Does someone keep the 
boxes in balance? 
conflict among people? 
Helpful mechanisms: 
Do all needed tasks 
+ have incentives? 
Weisbord's Six-Box Organizational Model 
Figure 2.0 
Source: M.R. Weisbord, "Organizational Diagnosis: Six places to Look for Trouble with or 
without a Theoly, " Group and Organization Studies (1976). 
b) The Nadler-Tushman Congruence Model 
Nadler and Tushman also assume that an organization is an open system 
and therefore is influenced by its environment and to some extent by outputs. An 
' 
organization is thus the transformation entity between inputs and outputs (See Figure 2.1 
for the diagram of the model). Nadler and Tushman view inputs to the system as 
relatively fixed, and they include the environment, the resources available to the 
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inputs help define how people in the organization behave, and they serve as constraints on 
behavior as well as opportunities for action. The environment consists of the larger parent 
system and the rest of the world, including government regulations, competitors, and the 
market place in general. 
a Resources within this model include capital (money, equipment, property), 
raw materials, technologies, people, and other intangibles that may have value in the 
organizations market. 
a The history of the organization determines, for example, patterns of 
employee behavior, policy, the types of people the organization attracts and recruits, and 
even how decisions are made in a crisis. 
Strategy is the process of determining how the organization's resources are 
best used within the environment for optimal organizational functioning. It is the act of 
identifying opportunities in the environment and determining whether the organization's 
resources are adequate for capitalizing these opportunities. Some organizations are very 
strategic; they plan. Others simply react to changes in their environments or act 
opportunistically rather than according to long-range plans. 
Nadler and Tushman point out that organizations have strategies whether they are 
deliberate and formal or unintentional and informal (Burke 1987). 
Nadler and Tushman present four key types of system outputs: system 
functioning, group behavior, inter-group relations, and individual behavior and affect. 
With system functioning, information is drawn from how well the organization is 
attaining its desired goals of production, service, etc. how well the resources are utilized, 
17 
and how well the organization is coping with the changes in the environment over time. 
Other behavioral outputs are understood by how well groups or units in an organization 
are perfonning, how effectively they communicate, resolve conflict, and collaborate. 
Transformation process is composed of the task component that includes jobs to 
be done and the character of work. Individual component consists of all differences and 
similarities among employees. Organizational design elements include managerial and 
operational structures of the organization, workflow and design, and the reward systems. 
These elements are the formal mechanisms used by management to direct and control 
behavior and to organize and accomplish the work to be done. Informal organization is 
the social structure within which the organization including the organizations' internal 













The Nadler- Tushman Congruence Model for Diagnosing Organizational Behavior 
Figure 2.1 
Source: D. A. Nadler and M.L. Tushman, "A Diagnostic Model for Organization Behavior, " in 
Perspectives on Behavior in Organizations, ed. J. R. Haclanan, EE. Lawler, and L. W. Porter (New York 
McGraw-Hill, 1977). 
Nadler and Tushman recommend the following three steps for diagnosis: 
Identify the system or the organization, its boundaries, members, its tasks, 
and its relationship with other units. 
Determine the nature of the key variables. What are the dimensions of the 
inputs and components? And what are the desired levels of outputs. 
Diagnose the state of fits, determining fits between components and 
diagnosing the link between fits and organizational outputs. 
Considering the component fits, or lack thereof, the system outputs helps 
identi@ critical problems of the organization. As these problems are addressed and 
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changes are made, the system is then monitored through the feedback loop for purposes 
of evaluation. 
c) Organizational Systems Framework 
The last to be looked at is the organizational systems framework. 
The critical factors of this model are: 
Environment/Context. This includes elements like political, economic, 
social, and technological conditions within which the organization operates. The 
environment has needs that the organization must satisfy and also exerts pressures that 
must be managed by the organization. These pressures may consist of specific 
organizational results, social, legal, or political expectations, budgets, growth patterns, 
development of technology and people, material shortages, innovations, expectations of 
the employees and their families about such factors like job security, career growth, and 
wages. Context includes today's environmental needs and pressures as well as those that 
may have a strong impact on the organization's future. 
System Direction. The system direction states the organization's reason for 
being and its strategy of moving the organization into the fkture. It consists of the 
organization's mandate, mission, and underlying values and assumptions and strategies. 
All these elements determine what is important in the system; they define what will be 
done and what will not be done in the fkture. They also determine what critical tasks of 
the system will be and what tasks members will focus their attention on. 
The Design Elements. These are the organizational elements, such as tasks 
and technology, structure, rewards, people, information systems and decision-making 
20 
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process that are used to execute the organization's mission. These elements provide 
structure to work tasks and reenforce patterns of behavior. How people are organized to 
do their work and how they interact with each other are all critical factors among the 
design elements. 
0 Culture. The observable work habits and practices that explain how the 
organization really operates define the organizational culture. It can also be viewed as 
behaviors, values, rites, creeds, and rituals found in organizations. The behaviors and 
work patterns one can observe and the underlying assumptions that often cause the 
behaviors are the core components of culture. 
Organizational Results. Results are comprised of outputs being delivered 
by the organization in terms of its products and or services it provides. Results also 
include the consequences of the organization's operations, which are labeled as the 
organization's outcomes. 
F. CHOICE OF ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK 
The Organizational Systems Framework was chosen as a diagnostic tool to assess 
the Rwandese Patriotic Army Logistics Unit (G4 Army). The assessment is the subject of 
Chapter (N), and figure 2.2 is the framework's illustration. The model addresses a 
number of key variables that are not covered by other models. Most importantly, it 
illustrates the extent to which organizational variables are congruent or fit one another. 
By tracing problems and results to misfits and problematic flows among systems 
components and design factors assessors can discover enduring systems features that 
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account for organizational malfunctioning and identify systemic causes. The model 
further alerts us to look for possible side effects of unanticipated actions and hard-to- 
diagnose consequences that can alter the status quo within the system. These 
unanticipated outcomes can occur when changes in one system component lead to 
developments somewhere in a distant, but interdependent part of the system. 
The organizational systems framework based on systems theory is useful because 
it helps assessors avoid common mistakes, as outlined by (Hanna 1978): 
Treating an organization as if it were a piece of machinery. Mechanistic 
procedures of machine theory work against living systems' natural tendencies, and 
therefore constrain effectiveness and output; 
members; 
Assuming that organizational goals are also the goals of the organizational 
Ignoring the complex environment and looking only inside the 
organization for planning and problem solving; 
Looking for one best way to manage. Instead, managers should be 
encouraged to propose actions that lead to the desired results; 
Believing in a singular cause and effect relationship between systems 
variables, when in most cases there are many causal factors. Systems thinking helps us 
identify multiple causes and effects and to understand the resulting relationships; 
Dealing with only one piece of the total system while ignoring the impact 
on the whole; 
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Treating irregularities in the system as though they were errors in 
performance when in some cases they might be caused by changes in the larger 
environment. Feedback loops are needed to clarify if performance is unacceptable because 
the target has been missed (negative feedback) or to a movement in the target (positive 
feedback); 
Forgetting that the purpose or the organization is also determined by the 
environment and not the organization alone; 
Failing to realize that people, as open systems, are also self regulating and 
usually function in an optimal manner when: goals are clear, there is goal commitment, 
they have reasonable autonomy, and lastly, when there is clear feedback in the system; 
Believing that motivation is something to give to others, rather than 
something that is intrinsic to individual energy level and interests; 
Assuming that people are uncooperative, when in fact they may have 
different goals; 
Spending much time measuring the results rather than the purpose and not 
questioning whether the purpose is still appropriate; 
Ignoring group process by issuing directives and then depending on 
individuals to get the job done; 
Not recognizing that resistance to change is always connected with the 
systems natural tendency to preserve its state of equilibrium; 
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Failing to distinguish between accountability and responsibility. Managers 
get caught up in the core work, rather than making management's unique contribution 
through "boundary management." 
A systems approach is very useful when analyzing organizations because it 
shows the interrelationships between all the factors that influence an organization. The 
approach assumes that an organization can only be understood by looking at the sum of all 
parts and at the level of congruence between them. Congruence is the degree to which the 
system components interact and create interdependencies between parts. The parts of an 
organization can fit well together and function effectively, or they can fit poorly and lead 
to problems, dysfunction, and poor performance. The basic assumption is that 
organizations will be more effective and efficient with greater congruence or better fit 




Environment/ Context (External to the System) 
Political Economical 
Social Technological Ecological 
outputs 
$. 
What does the system offer/ produce in terms of goods and services? How are the outputs measured? What are the indicators of 
performance? 
Outcomes 
What are the implications/ consequences of outputs for stakeholders? How are outputs interpreted in view of the environment? 
.................. ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 
~~ 
Key Success Factors (What does it take for the system to be successful?) 




Mandate, Values, Mission, 




1 1  
Design Factors 
What are the basic tasks? 
What specifications are required? 
What differentiation is required? 
Technology 
Describe the workflow. What are the key 
interdependencies among the work units or 
activities in the workflow? 
Describe the physical facilities and equipment. 
Structure 
What are the basic groupings of 
activities and people? 
Are these groupings a good fit with 
the workflow? How are the groupings 
integrated? What are the integrating 
devices used? 
Hierarchy? Task forces? Integrating 
roles? Matrix? Networks? 
 
Process/ Subsystems 
Human Resource Management 
Who is recruited and selected? Are we 
hiring the right kinds of people? How 
do we train and develop people and are 
our current efforts adequate? What is 
rewarded and do they fit the desired 
pattern of behavior? 
Measurement and Controls 
How are people held accountable for 
resources? Do these mechanisms of 
accountability produce the desired 
pattems of behavior? 
Planning, Communication and 
Information Management 
How do we plan? How do we 
communicate? How do we gather, 




What are the prevalent norms and values in the system? How is conflict managed? What are the formal and informal pattems of 
interaction? Does the culture impede or facilitate integration of effort? Does the culture fit the larger environment? 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK 
Figure 2.2 
: ..................................................................................................................................................................... ....................................................................... 
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111. THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC ARMY LOGISTICS 
ORGANIZATION (G4) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Rwanda is a small and poor central African country with an area of 26,000km2 
and a population of eight million people. The Rwandese Patriotic Army (R.P.A), the 
national m y ,  began as a rebel guerrilla army, which invaded the country fiom Uganda in 
October 1990. In 1994, this guerrilla army defeated the government forces and overthrew 
the regime responsible for genocide during which time about one million people lost their 
lives. After the war, the force was reorganized with the reintegration of some of the 
former Rwandese military members, who did not take part in the killings, to form the new 
national military. 
Initially the new military started with the army as the biggest military service and 
a small National Gendarmerie, a national police service. Both of the services were under 
the Ministry of Defense. Gradually, since then, other services and departments have been 
added. These include the airforce, the military police and the military justice department, 
and the intelligence services. Other units and departments are still evolving as needed and 
as resources become available. Some other changes are being carried out as the need 
arises, for example the National Gendermerie has been dissolved and replaced with a 
national police force which is under the ministry of internal affairs. 
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The former national military was approximately 10,000 in 1990. Currently the 
military stands at about 40,000. This growth can be explained by the R.P.A's intensive 
recruitment during the war, and the subsequent reabsorption and reintegration of former 
government military. However, limited recruitment has taken place since the end of the 
war in 1994. 
The new national military is in its sixth year and is still slowly changing fiom a 
guerrilla force into a regular military force. Drastic changes in force structure are taking 
place. The country still faces a high security threat, budgetary resources are scarce, and 
military expectations regarding combat resources, as well as the soldier's individual 
requirements, must be addressed to keep them motivated and responsible. 
B. DIRECTION 
Because the security threat is still high, the government has been compelled to 
intensify military operations to better equip the military. To cope with this challenge, the 
government has mandated the Defense Ministry to build a strong military by increasing 
its effectiveness and efficiency. 
And to realize this goal, the defense ministry will have to: 




Equip the forces with relevant skills and knowledge through training and 
Provide the military with the necessary logistical tools and equipment to 
execute the given missions; 
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Reorganize the military so as to have optimal force readiness. 
The Role and Responsibilities of the Army Logistics Service (Army G4) 
Although all initiatives and responsibility for building a regular military force are 
the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense, the army plays a crucial role because it is 
the major source of resources, personnel, and infrastructure. Providing logistical services 
and materials necessary for military operations is the responsibility of the Army G4 (the 
logistics service of the Army). The G4 is primarily a department of the army service, but 
it is nonetheless responsible for the majority of field logistics activities of all military 
services and defense offices. All other services’ logistics officers work closely with the 
G4 army and most of their work is subordinate to the G4, with the only exceptions being 
cases of specialized service requirements which are not used by all the military in general. 
Other specific categories of logistics handled outside of the G4 are medical 
equipment, medicines, weapons and ammuhitions, and communication and 
telecommunication equipment, which are handled by specific departments in the ministry 
headquarters. (See Figure 3.1 for the organization structure of all departments involved in 
the logistics hnction at both ministerial and service level.) 
The army G4 has three basic functions: 
The management of materials, which covers such activities as general supply 
distribution, procurement, material disposal/ decommissioning and logistics information 
management; 
Inventory management and distribution of materials; 
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Defense contract administration and management, although the management and 
administration of contracts is supposed to be the official responsibility of the ministry 
headquarter departments. 
The G4, in consultation with the field forces, works to design, requisition, 
procure, and shape the logistics requirements and policies of the military in general and 
the army in particular. The logistics service maintains, services, and replenishes the 
forces’ inventory equipping the forces with the necessary resources needed to fulfill their 
operational obligations. 
Routine activities of the service include: selection of items required by the 
military; management of the allocation system; initiation and execution of small 
procurement contracts (especially in the case of transport maintenance requirements); 
design and management of logistics policies; and disposal and retirement of defense 
property (this essentially involves writing off and disposing of vehicles). 
The Army G4 is staff to the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Staff mandates 
him to manage the army’s logistics needs and to support the force in realizing its mission. 
However, in addition to this mandate, the G4 service has additional responsibilities to 
handle all general field logistics activity for all the military services. The G4 is implicitly 
mandated to handle all general military logistics activities. Functionally G4 is held 
responsible for the management of all general logistics activities shared by all the 
services. G4’s additional responsibility mainly stems from the need to take advantage of 
economies of scale by making all services share the existing army logistics infrastructure 
instead of setting up new expensive networks for the relatively new and smaller military 
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services. Centralizing the activities in the G4 minimizes duplication of roles and 
activities. The army still remains the major service. It is the foundation for creating any 
new military service when needed. 
This arrangement explains the Army G4's additional logistics responsibilities and 
related processes of budget preparation and contract administration. (See Appendix A for 
a detailed description of the extra responsibilities of the G4. And refer to Figure 3.1 for 
the actual position of the G4 in the defense logistics network). 
G4 responsibilities include: 
Evaluations and requisitions of logistical requirements which include 
assessing quantities, quality, and the value of material and the service needs of 
the army; 
Establishment of a safe and economic distribution network and depots; 
Establishment of use and control procedures of all logistics resources; 
Preparation and establishment of logistics policy guidelines; 
Evaluation of infrastructure and accommodation needs of the army; 
Verification and protection of supply networks and logistical infrastructure. 
C. DESIGN FACTORS 
1. The Organization Structure and Major Functions of the G4 
(See Figure 3.3 for the formal organization structure of the G4 within the army 
structures). The figure shows that the logistics chief directly answers to the Army Chief of 
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Staff through the Deputy Army Chief, and it shows the G4 administrative and functional 
directorates and sections. Figure 5 represents the current detailed operational structure of 
the G4 up to the field unit. 
The G4 service has three major directorates through which it fulfills its 
responsibilities: 
a) Directorate of Transport 
b) 
c) 
Each of the directors is mandated by the G4 respectively to carry out the following 
Directorate of Supplies and Stores 
Directorate of Barracks, Engineering and Construction 
specific functions: 
a) The Director of Supplies and Stores 
The Director is responsible to the G4 for: 
1) Evaluating and planning of material supplies which include food, clothing, 
and all other general items required by the army; 
2) Requisitioning, receiving, storing, and distributing these materials to end 
users; 
3) Ensuring security of supplies until they are delivered to final users; 
4) Coordinating of all field units’ and services’ Supply officers and 
quartermasters to establish quality service to units. 
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Other general items; 
The food section handles all food items for the military, especially dry 
foods and packed or tinned rations for operations. Other routine individual rations are 
issued to individuals in form of a monthly ration cash allowance. 
The clothing section handles clothing materials like uniforms, boots, and shelter 
materials like tents and ponchos. 
All other items fall under the other items section. 
These three sections work with unit supply officers to establish quantity and 
quality of requirements, replacement intervals, and allocation and distribution policies for 
all the military. They also maintain information about domestic sources and costs of 
1ocaIly available items. For imports, the sections advise the G4 on the quality and other 
specific requirements or particulars that may be needed and then G4 advises the relevant 
ministry departments which then process the procurement. Activities in the supplies 
directorate are simple and programmed with very rare exceptions in the normal activities. 
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b) The Director of Transport 
The Director is responsible to the G4 for: 
All decision making in matters of transportation; 
Planning and coordinating all routine transportation requirements especially for 
administrative purposes and establishing optimal alternatives in movements and 
deployment of transport means; 
Requisitioning, receiving, storing, and distributing transport service requirements like 
fuels, parts, and any other related materials; 
Managing inventory and designing allocation and distribution procedures; 
Coordinating all units and services at all levels in transportation matters, which 
include movements, maintenance, and repairs. The director also works closely with 
field logisticians to design efficient and effective ways of managing transportation 
operations. 
The transport directorate has the following three major fictional divisions: 
maintenance, fuels, and administration. The directorate is the only section in the G4 
service that directly manages part of its budget. It has a quarterly allocation of 
100,000,000 Rwandese Francs (FRw) specifically earmarked for motor vehicle 
maintenance operations. 
Maintenance, a technical division handling mechanical and technical repairs and 
service, designs and plans maintenance requirements and schedules, evaluates the quality 
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of property and the lifespan of material, advises on transportation guidelines and 
establishes operational rules and procedures. Tasks in the maintenance section, although 
at times challenging and complicated, mainly follow established procedures and 
processes. 
The maintenance division is the busiest section in the directorate, and it is also the 
biggest employer of civilian technicians in the Ministry of Defense. It employed 56 
civilians in 1999, a decline from 75 in 1998. The civilian technicians are skilled and are 
rewarded accordingly to retain them because they are highly demanded in the private 
sector. 
The fuel section handles all types of fuels, oils, and lubricants, from requisition, 
reception, storage, to allocation and distribution to end users throughout all deployments. 
This section also advises the director on he1 usage and accountability rules and 
procedures. 
The administrative section in the directorate is a support section that coordinates 
plans and shapes transport operational policies, handles personnel matters, collects all 
feedback for the directorate, and advises the director on all issues in the directorate. It is 
basically the control and monitoring center of the transport directorate. 
c) Director of Barracks, Engineering and Construction 
The director is mandated by the G4 to: 
Repair, maintain, and manage all military bases, communication routes, energy 
resources and all other military infrastructure and facilities on military bases. Routine 
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operations of the directorate include: procurement of parts and maintenance materials, 
limited construction and renovations, and management of military infrastructure and 
facilities. This department's primary duties include: 
Ensuring supervision and control of military construction work contracted to 
private contractors; 
Managing inventory of non-movable assets, which include documentation and 
registration of facilities like buildings, depots, land, and forests; 
Acquiring and distributing construction and repair materials to sites where 
they are needed. 
The directorate is sub-divided into: 
Housing, which is responsible for maintaining living quarters, for allocating 
quarters to military members, according to established procedures and 
guidelines, and designing means and ways of expanding housing units; 
The maintenance unit, which is responsible for repair and service materials for 
existing facilities; 
Work in the directorate is technical and requires skills in civil and mechanical 
engineering at various levels, but currently, activities are still limited to maintenance and 
repairs. Operations in the directorate are still simple and do not demand special skills. 
The army G4 service is hctionally structured with the three major 
responsibilities formed into directorates. These, as already explained, include the 
transportation division, supply management, and housing construction and management. 
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Activities in the G4 are grouped according to functions and products at the 
directorate level. Further down in the field, logistics activities are structured according to 
both function and geography. All the major functions are duplicated in the different 
regions where the military deploys. Hence we have a combination of functional, 
geographical, and product structuring at different levels in the logistics service. Matrix 
structuring is also evident in the cases where logistics officers of other military services 
are subordinate to the G4, and also directly accountable to their various operational units. 
The G4 coordinates all operations in the three departments. The supplies and 
stores and the barracks ' and construction departments rely heavily on the transport 
department for means of transport, fuel, and maintenance services during their operations, 
but the transport department does not heavily depend on the other directorates; it is more 
self-sufficient than the other two. 
Due to the poor economy of the country, the army logistics service lacks most of 
the necessary equipment, tools and infrastructure for efficient and effective operation. As 
a consequence, its operating capability is greatly handicapped. Despite these constraints 
however, the service has survived. Despite the limitations, G4 has managed to serve the 
forces over the last five years with remarkable success. For example, most of the bases 
and facilities, like storage facilities and fuel depots, which were damaged during the war, 
have not been repaired. Few are currently fully operational. Secondly, only minor 
improvements have been made in the existing infrastructure instead of the much needed 
expansion to accommodate the increased force size. Also the new deployments have not 
been matched with the necessary infrastructure and facilities. This has lead to a situation 
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where many deployments are operating from rented, borrowed or temporary makeshift 
structures. Resources for both military operations and personnel welfare are very limited. 
It is difficult to clearly define the boundaries of the G4 in the ministry, mainly 
because the process of building the services is still going on, and therefore "restructuring" 
is adding some new functions to the G4 and removing others. (See Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 
3.3 for the approximate design and position of the logistics service at the Ministerial, 
Service, and Field levels respectively.) In addition to the organizational structures given 
in Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 Appendix A outlines some of the extra functions of the G4 
which are over-and-above the formal mandate given by the Army Chief of Staff. These 
extra functions are mainly activities related to the budget preparation process and 
contracting process. Both the budget preparation and acquisition activities are slowly 
gaining the joint participation of all the services and the Ministry of Defense departments. 
Because the Anny is the the major stakeholder in the military budget and contracting 
programs, it is necessary that the G4 gets aactively involved in these activities, despite the 
fact that both activities formally fall under the Ministry of Defense Offices. It would be 
accurate to assert that although the G4 is officially an Army logistics service the G4 is by 
and large functionally a"Defense Logistics Service." 
Most logistics activities focus on the Anny, which is by far the biggest service in 
the national military. All other services still operate as support units to the army. For 
example, the training academies receive most of their trainees fi-om the Army and most of 
the graduates are re-deployed to the army. The airforce also still operates as a support to 
the Army. It does not yet have the capacity to cany out independent operations. The 
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Republican Guard, although an independent service unit, is charged with internal police 
duties, particularly with the protection of VIPs. It also frequently operates jointly with the 
Army. The judicial and military police unit is responsible for enforcing discipline and 
legal activities with the Army as its largest client. 
Thus the military in Rwanda is still dominated by the army service with other 
services yet to develop into full and independent military services. They are still operating 
as army support units. 
Forming the military has been gradual and incremental. Other services have been- 
and still are-drawing both material and human resources for their development from the 
Army, and operating on the existing Army infrastructure. The services still share most of 
the logistics requirements, equipment, facilities and infrastructure. Exceptions are only in 
cases of special equipment and tools, such as aircraft parts and other aviation 
requirements. With time, some distinctions have developed, such as the designation of 
different service uniforms. Also with the advent of specialized activities, specialized 
equipment is being demanded. Nonetheless all other general requirements are still being 
shared and are still centrally managed by the army G4 on behalf of the Ministry of 
Defense. 
2. G4 Human Resources Sub-systems 
The army G4 or logistics service is a desirable employer and many employees 
enjoy working in the department. They view it as a career-enhancing department. For 
example, personnel see the maintenance section as a place to acquire vocational technical 
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skills in motor mechanics and truck driving. The construction and engineering division 
also provides the staff with opportunities to accumulate technical experience that can be 
important for individuals' employment opportunities, given the nations' 55% illiteracy 
rate. Working in all logistics departments is exciting and provides a sense of 
responsibility and importance. The staffs feel that their efforts and contributions directly 
impact military operations; hence, support among the staff is strong. The personnel 
proudly identify with the Army and the logistics department in particular. 
Despite the excitement, working in the logistics service is quite taxing and at 
times can be challenging, especially during intensive military operations or during periods 
of budgetary crisis. Again, it is important to note that to the other force members logistics 
employees seem privileged. Furthermore, G4 employees are often suspected of being 
corrupt by other soldiers. This is mainly because they have more access to the scarce 
resources of the army. The suspicion is fbeled by a general scarcity of material 
requirements. However, it is true that cases of theft of property, and misuse of public 
resources like vehicles, hel, food, and other materials sometimes occur. Thus soldiers 
who do not work in the logistics service perceive themselves as disadvantaged in some 
way, relative to the logistics employees. 
Official army personnel issues or human resource management fall under the army 
G1 (personnel and administration services). All other services and departments have to 
abide by personnel policy guidelines from the G1; therefore, the G4 has limited 
involvement in personnel matters, apart from routine internal operations involving the 
scheduling of tasks, and inter-personal relationships. 
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Issues related to hiring, retirement, rewards, and promotions are limited to 
proposals and recommendations to the G1 by respective units and services. Even though 
personnel matters fall outside the official logistics domain, all personnel policies directly 
and indirectly influence productivity of force members irrespective of which department 
they work for. 
It is therefore important to note that despite the progress being made in personnel 
matters, some subsystems are still underdeveloped. 
Recruitment has not been formalized and no formal program is in place to 
determine whom, when, and where to recruit. This is important since building a military 
is a continuous process that demands on-going recruitment, retention practices, and 
discharge. Selection, placement, and evaluation are still generally conducted based on 
subjective judgments and personal discretion. 
No policy guidelines concerning discharge and terms of service officially exist. 
Soldiers do not know what to expect in terms of when to retire, under what conditions 
one can opt to retire, and what to expect in retirement. There have been two discharges 
based on age, health or physical capability, and in some cases, special considerations. But 
retirement is not yet an established procedure, and it is not clear as to when it will be 
again, or when a routine discharge and recruitment will be formally instituted. In the past 
six years, I have met many young soldiers who wish to be discharged to go back to school 
or to join some other trades. But the army has not yet established procedures for dealing 
with such demands. This is because the military has been and is still preoccupied with 
operations. Only two discharges have been carried out in the past five years. In this 
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situation we have had soldiers who have gone to great extent to forge reasons that can 
easily grant them release. Other cases include feigning ill health to obtain a release on 
medical grounds, lying about a date of birth to overcome the age limit, and in extreme 
cases, complete refusal to work and desertion. On the other hand, there are some citizens 
who wish to join the military but cannot be enlisted. Even more frustrating, there is no 
schedule as to when recruitment will take place. No formal procedures of recruitment 
and discharge exist. Exception to this include: if one is over 40 years old for junior 
officers and enlisted personnel, or if one is medically proven incapable of military duty, 
but still one must wait for the general discharge to be released. Pressure for discharge and 
recruitment is growing. 
Terminal benefits and social security are crucial issues that also have not yet been 
addressed. All these issues definitely affect the members’ perception of the military, and 
if productivity and motivation are to be increased, they must be addressed. Meanwhile to 
improve the force members’ welfare, a credit and savings plan has been established so 
that members can possibly save resources to acquire houses or to invest in other 
productive ventures. More debates and discussions to solve these problems are still taking 
place and it is hoped that shortly some solutions will be realized. Proper planning to 
improve defense personnel conditions is still hampered by the uncertain security 
environment, which makes it hard to establish the country’s force size and structure. 
Consequently, this makes it hard to appropriately plan and implement programs to 
improve personnel welfare. 
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3. Army G4 Employees 
G4 employees can be categorized as follows: 
Technicians and mechanics mainly in transportation and construction 
departments; 
Drivers in the transportation department and fuel section employees; 
Supply officers and quartermasters in material management. 
The above categories form the bulk of logistics staffs in the defense 
establishment. Overall there are about 1,100 employees in the military logistics services. 
Unfortunately, no detailed break-down was available. Most employees associate with 
each other based on their jobs and departments and have a strong camaraderie spirit. They 
are also very enthusiastic towards work, establishing their own working procedures and 
schedules with limited supervision. Very often they contribute valuable advice to 
directors on how to improve work and use initiative when required to improve 
productivity. Most employees respect the chain of command, but feel free to offer advice 
when they deem it necessary and beneficial for the department. 
Despite this camaraderie and its positive effects on organizational goals, employee 
behavior sometimes becomes a liability, especially when the staff colludes to steal, 
damage property, or sometimes organize to manipulate the system to their own ends. For 
example, occasionally groups cover up for someone who steals or damages military 
property. In some other cases, employees may distort records to conceal poor 
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performance. Absenteeism and conflicts may go unreported until the situation becomes so 
serious that it reaches confrontational proportions. 
The G4 service lacks adequate skilled personnel in all its departments and this 
seriously impacts its efficiency and effectiveness. This shortage is being addressed 
through intensive training of servicemen in both technical and formal education programs 
at various levels, both within the country and overseas. On-job-training is a very popular 
practice to teach urgently needed skills, especially those quickly acquired through 
practice. This applies to mechanics, masonry and brick laying, bookkeeping and 
storekeeping to mention a few. 
Recruitment to the G4 is by identifjing individuals with the required skills or the 
basic education. The G4 then requests those individuals from the Army Chief of Staff. 
These individuals can be drawn from any unit or department in the Army and even when 
necessary, the Chief of Staff can request needed employees from the minister of defense, 
if the individuals are in other services outside the Army. All other deployments follow the 
current placement procedures of the military personnel department. Formal selection and 
placement to logistics department concerns only the appointment to the G4 office and the 
three Directors. The G4 and his Directors are appointed by the Minister of Defense with 
the recommendation of the Army Chief of Staff. Then these, with the occasional approval 
of the Army Chief of Staff, appoint all other staffs in the logistics department. 
Rewards are set up by the general defense remuneration system, which is 
primarily based on rank. Fringe benefits include accommodation allowances and free 
medical care for the individual and the immediate family members. Other forms of 
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rewards are promotions based on the evaluations and recommendations of individual 
units. Within units, employees can be recognized for outstanding performance and 
commended or even made supervisors. Unfortunately, the monthly salary cannot sustain 
the service member. This is the same for all public servants and therefore presents a 
national problem with no easy or immediate solution in the near future. 
Punishments are very severe to prevent discipline problems and enforce 
compliance. Realizing compliance and order in the present environment of post-genocide, 
high levels of security threat, and limited resources, demands strict regulations and rules. 
To address this issue, the military has had to strengthen the military police and the 
judicial department in an effort to streamline the judicial process. 
4. Army G4 Communication and Information Management 
The G4 service has open communication with all sections and all its clients. They 
are always in contact through face-to-face meetings, telephones, radio messages, and 
reports. All the communication is always geared to improving operations of the service. 
The Directors and staff in G4 have unlimited access to the G4, and all field officers can 
directly access the directors or even the G4 when necessary, whether on official business 
or any form of routine feedback. The communication process is very helphl in generating 
important feedback for improving, controlling, and monitoring the logistics process. 
Communication between the G4 and both the Chief of Staff and the Ministry of Defense 
is mainly top down. The G4 receives instructions and directives fiom the higher 
authorities and executes the directives as given, or if necessary, the G4 can give some 
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advice and recommendations, especially if it is in some logistics technical matters. 
Communication from G4 to higher authorities is mainly in the form of feedback on 
executed assignments, and requests and advice on operational needs. In the lower ranks, 
below the G4, communication is both up and down with almost equal exchange. Many 
consultations, exchanges of views, and advice take place within the G4 units and sections. 
5. G4 Decision Making 
Decision making in the logistics service is largely made by specific sections that 
conduct programmed technical activities with minimal supervision. Other decisions come 
from the G4 who occasionally is in close contact and consultation with the Army Chief of 
Staff and the Secretary General in the Ministry of Defense. Other decisions are made by 
the Chief of Staff who instructs the G4, as is the case with military institutions; orders 
and instructions are common. All technical decision making is delegated to the 
technicians who closely consult with directors during working routines. Decision-making 
is both centralized and decentralized, with centralization mainly at the top and 
decentralization and delegation common at the bottom. 
Decisions on when to replace old equipment and materials start as requisitions 
from the G4 to the Chief of Staff. Then the Chief of Staff advises the Minister of Defense 
on what the army needs. The minister then decides on whether to buy depending on how 
urgent the equipment or material is needed, and on whether money is available. In the 
past, the Ministry of Defense departments have been micro-managing the logistics service 
because they control all the resources to the G4. For example, the G4 could only submit a 
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list of army needs, and then the Ministry logistics departments would determine where to 
buy fi-om, what quantity, and even what quality. But these are key activities that genuinely 
require the participation of the army logisticians. Gradually, the G4 is progressively 
gaining control of most of its core activities and it is actively participating in the 
procurement and budget execution processes, which have previously been the Ministry of 
Defense's responsibility. 
Sometimes making decisions on matters like the release of f h d s  for office 
operations, granting leave to officers, who should occupy which house, and whose house 
should be repaired, and many others is so contentious that the Minister or the Chief of 
Staff has to intervene. This mainly results from a lack of policy guidelines on the terms of 
service and employment benefits and obligations. Where they exist, they are not observed 
or enforced. 
Thus decision making tends to be centralized in the chain of command at higher 
levels especially from the G4 and above. Within the G4 service, however, there is 
significant delegation, especially of technical tasks. Logistics policy issues are gradually 
coming to rely on the technical and professional expertise of the logisticians. In the past, 
policies were directly formulated at the top and handed down through the chain of 
command. This practice is slowly diminishing but centralization remains strong in areas 
of military accommodation and construction, and management of high value contracts. 
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6. Policy and Planning in the G4 
Planning has been difficult and has been more “wishful thinking” than actual 
planning. This is because planning is supposed to be a process of setting programs of all 
required courses of action given the available resources. This is not so in the G4. The 
office rarely has an idea of how much money is available to the army. Other than the 
vehicle maintenance fhd ,  which is set at Rwandese francs (FRW) 400,000,000 annually, 
and is released in quarterly installments to the transport directorate, no other funds 
formally flow to the G4. Planning for the army is further complicated by the lack of basic 
information on what the actual national force size and structure is supposed to be. The 
current structure and size are dictated by regional security circumstances. The current 
security environment has been very dynamic and therefore hard to predict. Planning 
effectively is not possible under the existing uncertain environment. 
Logistics policy making is seriously constrained by a lack of defense-wide formal 
logistics service. This becomes quite clear when the Army service passes directives on 
how to use some materials for example fuel. At that time, the airforce or formerly the 
gerndermerie could not be bound by such policies because they were different 
organizations. There are other instances where effective implementation of logistics 
policies or initiatives by the G4 have been constrained by the difference between the 
formal setup of the logistics service and the actual operating logistics process. 
Putting all uncertainties to the side, much remains to be done in planning for the 
military to benefit from informed decisions and programmed logistics operations. 
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7. Financial and Material Resources Management and Control 
The G4 has internal controls to account for the hnds and resource usage, and they 
are revised regularly. But, there are no independent internal or external audits to evaluate 
the ministry of defense controls in general or the logistics system in particular. 
Furthermore, there are no standards to provide an overall framework for establishing and 
maintaining internal controls or for identifying and addressing major performance and 
management challenges. Nor is there regular assessment of fraud, waste, abuse, or 
mismanagement. 
All financial matters are the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense with the G4 
primarily meant to handle material resources. Annually the G4 submits an action plan to 
the ministry through the Army Chief of Staff. It is this plan that represents the envisaged 
programs of the service. Until now, these plans served almost no practical purpose 
because the G4 had no idea how much money would be allocated to the army. Planning in 
the G4 is still an expression of material requirements and programs without any regard to 
whether the plans can be realistically achieved. And for that matter, these plans have not 
had any significant functional value. 
The G4 has a number of internal control processes designed to optimize resource 
usage, which include daily, weekly, and monthly inventory and material accountability 
reports, release and receipt procedures, occasional financial assessments (by the Ministry 
of Defense Finance Department) and verifications and quality controls. In addition, 
feedback from the field is also an important input in the control process because it 
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highlights problems and thereby guides corrective measures. This applies to both material 
and financial resources. It is important to mention that control measures in the logistics 
service are mainly an internal initiative, and therefore not based on national accounting 
requirements. No guidelines from government or the Ministry of Defense have to be 
followed, and no other branch of government audits the military. It is only the Minister of 
Defense who has twice commissioned investigations in the G4 operations as a response to 
possible inefficiencies in the department. By and large the current control processes are 
considered adequate and are progressively upgraded as necessary. 
Because the G4 mainly handles materials and equipment, accountability is mainly 
a justification of what and how much was used in a given period, general evaluation on 
what was achieved cannot yet be readily quantified. 
8. Performance Measures in the G4 
At the G4 level of operation, some evaluation measures are employed and others 
are being generated and are yet to be incorporated in the formal system. But in general no 
standardized performance appraisal measures exist for the defense department. Different 
departments adopt provisional procedures as independent internal evaluation and 
assessments. There is therefore no agreed upon framework for evaluation, and issues of 
what, how, and when to measure do not exist. 
Some of the internal evaluation procedures for the G4 are: 
Accident rates (what was the annual accident rate relative to the past year); 
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Labor productivity (technicians) based on number of vehicles repaired and 
serviced per person per year; 
Input and output relationship, what was planned and how much was received 
to execute the programmed activity? 
The table shows the resources received as a percentage of what was requested. 
Directorate 
Transport 
Supplies and Stores 
Barracks, Engineering 
and Construction 
G4 Performance Report for the Fiscal and Calendar year 1999 as % of Programmed 
Activities 
*( Based on Resources received for the Programmed Activities) 
Resources Received as % of Projected Requirements for thc 
Year 





According to accident reports, the accident rate reduced from 14% in 1998 to 
7.9% in 1999. These improvements have been attributed to improved road conditions, 
training and control of drivers, and the improved maintenance and service of military 
vehicles. 
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Labor productivity rates in motor vehicle maintenance and repairs, (measured in 
number of vehicles repaired per technician) productivity per technician increased from 56 
vehicles per individual in 1998 to 105 vehicles per technician in 1999. Increased 
productivity was due to hiring of competent skilled mechanics, relatively newer vehicles, 
and improved maintenance and repairs management. All these are based on official 
internal G4 records. Evaluations are done on comparative basis i.e. the recent 
performance relative to the past period. 
D. CULTURE 
The organization has a strong camaraderie spirit, with friendly and helpful 
employees. They are very committed to the organization and their work. They know the 
organization and understand it very well. Everyone knows what it takes to succeed, 
survive, or fail in the organization. 
E. OUTPUTS 
In the past five years, the logistics service has successfully managed to provide the 
fighters with the necessary war fighting requirements. The military has fought two wars 
to a successful conclusion. One war was in 1996-1997 against the former Zaire regime 
and the Rwandese ex-military it was supporting, and the second one was an internal 
insurgence of former militaries and militias who were repatriated in the war against 
former Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Army still is currently 
operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo against the former military and militias 
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who killed vast numbers of people and their Congolese supporters. Despite the limited 
and scarce resources, the logistics units have been successhl in mobilizing and delivering 
the available materials to the fighters from wherever they have been operating. 
The main reason for these successes have been attributed to the patriotism of the 
service members in general and the logistics staffs in particular who, despite inadequate 
remuneration and limited operational resources, have remained committed to their 
primary responsibilities. Apart from noting that soldiers have been performing well, and 
bearing in mind that the G4 has been delivering them material and services they need, it is 
not possible to rank the logistics services' performance objectively. This is because no 
objective performance standards and measures for evaluation exist. 
From the interviews I had with the various logistics officials, it can be concluded 
that, although the logistics service has had significant achievements in its operations and 
as new initiatives are still being adopted there is more need and room for further 
improvements. The turbulent external environment demands a very efficient and effective 
use of the limited resources. The Defense Ministry needs to be shaped so that it can take 
advantage of environmental opportunities and at the same time be in position to face the 
hture challenges. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE G4 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter uses the organizational framework and applies it to the G4 
organization described in Chapter III. The systems model is a framework for viewing an 
organization wholistically in terms of its internal components and external environment. 
The model consists of design factors, which are shaped by the organizations' context, key 
success factors, and strategic direction. These combined with organizational culture, 
influence organizational outputs and outcomes. Figure 2.2 is the systems model discussed 
in Chapter II. And Figure 4.0 is an adaptation of the systems model to the G4 
organization. This diagram translates results of the analysis into various categories 
captured by the systems model. 
A discussion of each component follows. 
B. CONTEXT 
G4 Army is greatly influenced by the external environment, resources and history. 
The political and economic environment is particularly relevant to the context of the G4. 
The environment currently includes high security threats facing the region in general and 
the country in particular, budgetary constraints, and pressure from external donors to cut 
defense expenditure. The country is caught between high security threats and intense 
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external pressure from donor nations to reduce the military's size and defense spending so 
that the government can instead invest more in social programs. 
The social environment demands the government rehabilitate its infrastructure, 
repatriate refugees and resettle returnees. Other pressing social demands include 
programs to address problems of genocide orphans and other survivors and development 
of the judicial system. 
G4 is resource-constrained. Its budget and skilled personnel are inadequate, 
unfortunately no data are available to pinpoint the actual deficiencies. The scarcity 
paradoxically contrasts with the current intense and demanding needs of the army. It is 
within this dilemma that the need for more efficient use of available resources has 
become more obvious and inevitable. 
1. Key Success Factors 
The G4 operates in a responsive mode reacting to demands of its clients as they 
come; also, it mainly relies on constantly switching priorities and mobilizing available 
resources and energy according to needs of the moment. 
2. System Direction 
The mission statements, given by the G4, describe an attempt to balance the needs 
of the forces given the available scarce resources. The organization constantly adjusts 
priorities to meet emergent needs. Constant shifting of priorities has reduced mission 
clarity, disrupted planning and programming and therefore eroded the overall 
organizational performance. Although not serious in the short-term, this situation is very 
detrimental to the long-term performance of the organization. 
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The intense operations since 1994 have not allowed the Army to evaluate and 
properly spell out what it wants to be and how it can make changes. Most attention has 
been directed toward countering security challenges. It is becoming apparent, however, 
that an efficient logistics service is essential and cannot be postponed. It is also important 
to note that growth and development of the Army has not been a result of long-term 
efforts, but rather a reactive response to the turbulent national and regional security 
environment. This has a significant impact on the current behavior and operations of the 
G4 organization. 
In addition to all that has been mentioned, frequent reshuffles and constant 
turnover in personnel, especially at top levels of the organization, disrupt the continuity 
necessary to develop and maintain organizational direction. New managers, leaders, and 
employees quickly get engaged in day-to-day issues and emerging crises. Hence, there is 
no corporate memory to help the organization avoid repeating past mistakes, or to use 
experiences to design and establish better work processes. Of immediate concern is 
putting out "organization fires" with minimal, if any, regard to a long-term strategic 
focus. Furthermore, the G4 lacks periodic evaluations to indicate whether it is actually 
realizing its primary goals. 
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-4 Environment/ Context (External to the System) Political Uncertainties, Regional Insecurity, A weak National Economy, and a Fractured Society, 
1 A I 
Key Success Factors (what does it take for the system to be successful?) 
Responsive Organization, mobilizing available resources and energy to 
e m e r ~ i n ~  events. 
.c 
Systems Direction 
Provide the army with logistical support for mission accomplishment. 
c
Tasks 
Planning, programming, requisitioning, 
acquiring, storing, allocating, maintaing, 
servicing, and distributing all logistical material 
and equipment to the army. 
Technology 
Mainly routine, simple technology, activities are 
carried out according to established procedures 
despite being reactive rather than pro-active. 
Exceptions are in planning and forecasting 
where evaluations are dictated by circumstances. 
Structure 
A centralized chain of command and 
functional structure at upper levels 
and a decentralized technical and 
field activities, integration is by 
hierarchy of authority. 
~~ 
People 
Young, few skilled, but very 
committed, with a lot of 
expectations from the organization. 
I 
Process1 Subsystems 
Human Resource Management 
Appraisals are subjective and intuitive 
lacking objective metrics. There are no 
formal recruitment, selection, rotation, 
promotion, rotation, retirement or 
discharge policies. There is a lack of 
skilled personnel. 
Training is mainly by on job training, 
workshops, and formal education. 
Compensation package is monthly salary, 
recognition and promotion. 
Measurement and Controls 
Internal controls include segregation of 
duties, documentation and reporting, and 
periodic reviews and checks. 
Information Management 
Communication is top-down, with both 
lateral and vertical exchange at lower 
levels. 
There is no functional planning. 
Culture 
Employees have strong camaraderie spirit, associate according to roles, very proud and identify with the employer. They are committed 
to the organization. They know very well that to advance and succeed you only need to take care of short-tem issues, which give quick 
and clear results. Concern for long-term issues is not highly regarded in the organization. Conflict resolution is handled through the 
chain of command. 
v 
outputs 
Provision of material, equipment and service to the fighter. 
Outcomes 
Force readiness, morale, improved welfare, cost savings, customer satisfaction, reduced wastage and accidents 
..................... , ............. ............................................................................ 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS FRAME WORK ADAPTED TO G4 
Figure 4.0 
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C. DESIGN FACTORS 
1. Technology and Tasks 
The G4’s broad mission is to ensure the provision of all materials, equipment, and 
services to the forces to enable the military to execute the national defense obligation 
optimally. Tasks in this broad mission include: planning, requisitioning, procuring, 
storing, allocating, distributing, maintaining and servicing materials and equipment for 
the Army. The tasks vary from simple routine activities to some complex and technical 
activities, especially in preparing requirements and processing procurement. 
Work within the G4 directorates is largely routine work with standard operating 
procedures. For example maintenance of vehicles, management of fuel and stores, and 
rationing available items are carried out according to established procedures with minimal 
alterations. 
The critical roles of formulating long-term operational plans, and conducting 
operational audits do not count in the priorities of day-to-day operations, and are not 
allotted the needed time and resources by the management and Defense leadership. This 
is a serious problem, which blinds the organization to long-term focus and instead ties the 
G4 to short-term and immediate issues. In other words, the G4 working time is basically 
spent on administrative work and does not have enough time to attend to the essential 
operational and management tasks. 
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2. Structure 
The G4 is structured functionally with three directorates at the (Directorate) upper 
level and has a matrix structure at the field level where the organization is sub-divided 
according to both fbnction and geography. The structures fall within the traditional 
military chain of command. 
The structure of the G4 is practically misaligned with the mandate and missions; 
this is because G4 is informally charged with all defense logistics activities, whereas the 
organization is formally structured as an army logistics service. The extra informal 
responsibility of serving as a defense logistics department overwhelms the current formal 
G4 structure. This lack of fit creates confusion in the actual mandate and mission of the 
G4. See Figure 3.2 for the actual ground operations of the G4 and See Figure 3.3) for G4's 
formal organization structure. These two structures are very different and the difference 
accounts for some of the gaps and malfimctions in the operations of the G4. 
Dependence on informal structures and ambiguous role definition create overlaps 
and confbsion especially in budgeting and acquisition and contract management activities 
between the Ministry of Defense departments and the G4. The current structure of the 
logistics service centralizes the budget and acquisition activities in the Ministry of 
Defense thereby isolating the ground logistics units .(G4) from the crucial budget and 
contract management activities. The isolation reduces G4's capacity to plan, program, 
control, and coordinate the general logistics function. Hence, the present structure limits 
the Army and the G4's capacity in setting Army priorities and proper management of the 
logistics activities. 
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Unclear mandate and mission, structural overlaps result in confusion and conflict. 
For example, the Army is more focussed on realizing the security objective 
(effectiveness), whereas defense management is much more concerned with both 
effectiveness and efficiency of operations. The lack of fit between the two complicate 
efforts to balance efficiency with effectiveness. 
Also, the G4 operations are not well integrated with field unit operations. For 
example, unit commanders have a "do not care" attitude about logistics issues in their 
units. They tend to pay more attention to other operational matters and leave logistics 
matters to the junior and inexperienced personnel in the units. Interest and concern only 
surfaces when there is acute shortage, or when there are specific instructions from the 
Army Chief detailing particular actions to be taken. The gap undermines efforts toward 
efficiency and accountability and very often leads to misuse and waste, especially in the 
field units. 
The current G4 structure is result of the country's military history. This structure 
was appropriate in the past when the "Military was the Army". When the Defense 
department and the Army were small, they were adequately fbnded both in the national 
budget and from outside through abundant military assistance from former colonial 
countries. With time, the Army has expanded and there are no extra resources available 
for the Ministry of Defense. But the logistics organizational structure has remained 
relatively unchanged. Hence the old structure is no longer congruent with the current G4 




Personnel in the G4 are mainly young men, who are looking to the future, 
anticipating developing careers and meeting other personal expectations. Unfortunately, 
the G4 still lacks the right people both in number and skills for optimal deployment of the 
very scarce material and financial resources. There are few specialized, competent, and 
knowledgeable employees who can appreciate the complexities of the situation. The 
organization definitely requires qualified personnel who can devise, plan and effectively 
implement logistics policies that fit the given circumstances. Specifically there is a severe 
shortage of specialized talents in the fields of finance, management and administration, 
acquisition, and other administrative and leadership roles. 
Furthermore, the b y  lacks mechanisms for identifymg, selecting, placing, 
training, and developing the necessary manpower for the organization. Hence the 
organizational and individual personnel expectations cannot be satisfied. This problem is 
service wide. Another reason for some of the problems in the G4 is that growth and 
expansion of the Army has not had a corresponding growth of the support services, 
especially the G4. The unproportional growth seriously constrains the G4 capacity to 
operate. Meanwhile, recent efforts to solve the manpower shortage are yet to yield results. 
However, not much can be realized in the short-term given the magnitude of the task at 
hand. 
People are the most important resource in any organization, especially in the 
Army and the G4, where work is labor intensive. Unfortunately, the organization does not 
have programs or mechanisms in place to meet employee expectations and wishes. This 
64 
issue requires immediate response in the Army's policymaking process, if the Anny hopes 
to keep a motivated and skilled pool of people. The Army at large needs to prove that it is 
a "pro-people" organization in order to continue attracting people to meet its manpower 
requirements for the future. Given the scarce financial and material resources in the 
Army, the most important and lasting contribution lays in improving and developing G4 
employees and creating an appropriate and attractive working environment. 
4. Processes and Subsystems 
a) Human Resource Management. The Army and the G4 lack a formal 
human management function. Selecting, training, rewarding, and developing people are 
still haphazard and uncoordinated tasks. They are neither linked to the organizational 
direction nor to its performance. Consequently there has been limited deliberate and 
coordinated formal effort to prepare personnel for the logistics function. Although it is 
common to hear managers talk of the need and shortage of skilled manpower, no 
organizational audit has been made to determine what those manpower needs are. There 
are no mechanisms in place to identify, train, and place skilled employees in the 
organization. Clearly, this is a serious problem in the national military. 
b) Rewards. Rewards in the organization as in all military services go to 
those with the ability to respond quickly and decisively. In other words, fire-fighting 
capabilities are sought and rewarded accordingly. The primary compensation package is a 
monthly salary. Another form of reward unique to the G4 is that it a place where 
employees acquire vocational skills in various technical fields. These skills are a valuable 
asset that benefits individuals when discharged from the military, this form of reward is 
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the most highly regarded by the G4 employees. Other forms of reward are promotions, 
commendations and recognition which are not yet formally institutionalized. 
c) Staffing. The G4 staffing, like in other support services, lags behind field 
operational units because command roles take priority. For example, it is only the G4 and 
the directors' positions that are officially appointed. The G4 and his directors fill other 
junior positions in the Army G4. This is done without any accurate objective criteria and 
often results in the placing of incapable and unqualified people to be responsible for very 
scarce organizational resources. 
d) Employees in the organization mainly care about the day-to-day operations 
because they are the basis for rewards and advancement of personnel. In addition to this, 
unclear tenure and lack of properly articulated personnel policies discourage managers 
and employees from having any long-term interest in the organization. Employees 
therefore, stick to short-term survival skills. The practice is counter-productive to the 
long-term functioning of the G4. 
e) Financial management. G4 only manages a transport maintenance fund; 
the rest of the Army budget is centrally controlled in the Ministry of Defense. The Army 
is demanding direct control of its budget so that it can properly plan, set its operational 
priorities, simplif4r and speed up the acquisition process, and form a working strategic 
planning process. Unless the Ministry of Defense gives the Army a more autonomous and 
active role in the budget and acquisition process, no significant improvement in the 
logistics activities can easily be attained. This is one of the reasons that prevents realistic 
or functional planning in G4. 
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f) Measurements and Controls. Organizational performance is measured by 
whether or not the organization delivers the available logistics to the forces and how 
equipment and materials are managed. Currently, there are no formal objective evaluation 
and measuring procedures in all the Ministry of Defense departments. Existing 
evaluations are an internal initiative of the G4. They are done on day-to-day basis and are 
not effectively used as guides for process evaluations, trend analysis, or forecasts. 
g) Controls. There are many internal mechanisms to control and to monitor 
the internal operations of the logistics department. They include establishing task teams to 
allocate available materials, standardize operating procedures, and write periodic 
accountability and operational reports. However, some of the procedures do not add any 
value to the organization. Instead they are considered to be obstacles to organizational 
improvement and operation. For example, the reports and other documentation are mainly 
prepared so as to record that regulations were complied with, without considering 
whether they actually add any value or are relevant to operational improvement. 
Sometimes a simple request goes through a long and tedious process which causes delays 
and extra costs. 
The consequence of these procedures is to make every employee comply with the 
status quo instead of attempting to be operationally efficient. There is limited room for 
innovation and failure. Nobody dares to try anything new outside the usual procedures 
because failure is punishable. Hence the G4 is not a "learning organization." In fact, some 
of its procedures inhibit rather than enhance higher performance. Thus, it should be no 
surprise that projections for the distant future are of limited interest in the organization. 
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h) Planning and Communication 
The G4 has no long range planning. Its major operations have a short-term 
orientation and therefore relegate strategic long-term planning and programming to a 
lesser role. This promotes the habit of learning the basic rules for survival, dealing with 
short term more obvious issues and making marginal incremental changes. Long-term 
planning becomes less important since every manager assumes he will be out after a short 
stay. This work attitude accounts for a number of malfunctions in the logistics activities 
of the Defense Services. Short-term focus ties the organization in routine administrative 
roles making the organization operate in a reactive rather than a pro-active mode. In 
addition to the mentioned problems, overlapping roles, ambiguities in the defense 
structure, and lack of clarity in the mandate and missions erodes the organization's 
planning and forecasting abilities. 
Obviously, communication is important to the operations of the G4 organization. 
The major communication mediums are telephones, radios, face-to-face meetings, reports 
and memos. Given the reactive mode in which the G4 operates, decision making is 
mainly top-down, where, the Army Chief of Staff instructs the G4 what priority issues to 
address and the G4 follows up on execution. There is limited use of feedback for planning 
and process improvement. 
i) Information Management. 
The G4 gathers and maintains a great amount of information about logistics 
operations, although it may be inaccurate and unreliable. There is a general lack of 
appreciation of the value of this information. It is often stored in an unusable form and it 
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is rarely used to improve operations. Consequently, the information ends up being 
ignored and discarded despite the energy and investment in gathering it. 
D. CULTURE 
The organization has a strong spirit of camaraderie, with friendly and helpful 
employees. They are very committed to the organization and their work. They have vested 
interest in G4 because they expect to acquire vital skills for their future personal benefit. 
They know the organization and understand it quite well. They know what it 
takes to succeed or to survive in the organization. 
Firefighting is the dominant culture in G4. The capacity to react quickly and 
decisively is automatically considered as being competent. This practice, coupled with 
absence of objective performance measures and job uncertainty, compels officers to do 
what will make them appear proficient in their jobs. Consequently people avoid change 
because it requires a long-term system wide perspective. Fear of failure at such a difficult 
undertaking, is understandable. Unfortunately this reluctance to change limits their 
opportunities to learn by doing. And such a culture undermines innovations and deep 
thinking, which are important for long-term process and organizational development. 
E. OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES 
The G4 has a broad mission of providing the fighter with needed materials, which 
include food, clothing, fuel transport and housing. The organization is also tasked to 
maintain and service these materials and equipment. 
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Outputs are measured by how quickly the forces receive what they need. The 
quality of the services can be measured by customer feedback (complaints, or 
appreciation), the availability of the requirements in inventory, the cost savings especially 
with efficient acquisition procedures, and the establishment of more cost effective storage 
and distribution networks, the rate of accidents, and the level of material loss and 
inventory accuracy. 
Currently, all the measures of outputs above cannot be objectively quantified. 
Furthermore, there are no evaluations of outcomes or the consequences of organizational 
output. Organizational assessment is still conducted in a reactive mode, dealing with 
events and preparing immediate cures in a crisis management mode. 
All the mentioned measures would be good formal procedures of performance 
evaluation and measurement of output. Unfortunately, there is very limited use of these 
measures in G4. 
In a few areas some quantitative measures may exist, but more generally, formal 
evaluation of organization performance as mentioned earlier are based on intuition, 
hearsay, and value judgment. 
The organization lacks formal systematic reference to accumulated experience and 
rarely is any effort spent on projecting the future. The major concern is here and now. The 
use of lessons learned from past experiences or forecasting and fkture projections does 
not exist in G4. 
70 
F. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE G4 OPERATIONS 
My recommendations to improve the G4 operations are based on the following 
assumptions: 
The military structure and size are to remain the same for sometime, i.e. 
given the current environment, no significant force reduction will be possible in the short- 
run and the Army will continue to dominate the Rwandese military for sometime. 
Economic conditions will not allow any more resources to become 
available to the Defense Department. Hence improvement can only come about through 
proper management of the available resources. 
The Army will assume responsibility for improving the human resources 
management function, which is currently underdeveloped. And change in some areas of 
the G4 can only be realized if there is broader systems change in the Army and generally 
in the Ministry of Defense logistics system. 
These recommendations are not the magic cure of G4 problems but rather they are 
intended to be starting points for more comprehensive and continuous deliberations of all 
possible improvement actions in the organization. 
Suggested recommendations are summarized in Table 2 based on the analysis in 
the previous section. A detailed description of the proposed changes follows. 
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G4 Change Recommendations 
Redefine Direction of the G4 vis a vis the Ministry of Defense and the Amy. This should 
include reexamination of its mandate and mission. 
Develop strategic planning and management process for G4. 
Revise design factors to be congruent with the new direction. 
Restructure and realign roles with the primary organizational mission. 
Conduct a value chain analysis to identify essential from non-essential and non-viable 
activities. 
Eliminate redundancies, non-core mission areas, and overlapping roles. 
Phase out fragmentation of work processes and instead improve coordination or related 
work processes. 
Group activities into a structure that is compatible with the new strategic direction. 
Redesign the structure to fit with the mission and processes. 
Consider ways of recruiting civilians to supplement G4 workforce. 
Establish a skilled manpower pool of logisticians in G4 who can then be deployed 
throughout all army units to the logistics function. 
Establish a management audit function to improve financial and operational eficiencies. 
Relate resources to outputs to evaluate efficiency. 
Should encourage vision, innovation, and learning through experiences. Discourage 
survival or complacency amongst organizational members. 
Create conditions favorable to organizational learning for general long-term process 
improvement. 
Identify and establish objective and clear measures of performance. 
Conduct continuous evaluations to see whether actual organizational results match the 
projected results, identify causes of disparities and devise measures to resolve them. 
Table 4.1 Summary of Change Recommendations for 6 4  Army. 
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1. Setting Direction 
G4 needs to develop a clear direction for the organization that is meaningful, 
relevant, and inspiring. The Army Chief of Staff should update G4's mandate to fit the 
present environment. There is need to address how the Army logistics service fits in the 
overall Defense logistics system. 
There are two possibilities for such realignment. The G4 mandate and operations 
can be revised to either: expand G4 formal responsibility, by incorporating all that it 
currently does but falls outside G4 formal mandate, or to re-focus the G4 to the core G4 
formal missions and then assign G4's current extra roles to other organizations. Either 
action would give G4 a clearer sense of unity, purpose, responsibility, and accountability. 
After establishing this new mandate and identity, G4 should set up its own 
strategic planning team to set its direction to clarify the organization's mission, values, 
vision, and strategies. 
2. Design Factors 
Implementing a new direction involves manipulating the system design elements. 
Congruence between the direction and design elements and among system components 
must be considered when making any changes. Each component must be considered both 
separately and collectively. Members of the G4 need to understand how changing an 
individual component impacts the whole organization. Any change should aim at 
bringing about more congruence among all the design elements. 
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a) Tasks and Technology 
G4 roles and responsibilities should be clearly identified then properly 
focussed towards achieving the organization's mandate and mission. G4 should 
concentrate all available resources on the core work of the organization. Involvement in 
too many activities at the same time can exhaust personnel, disrupt and divert attention 
from the essential activities and operations and waste scarce resources on non-essential 
activities. A strategic planing team should suggest which crucial activities should take 
priority, then, alternative ways of handling the non-essential activities can be devised. 
b) Structure 
Work should be restructured to support the primary mission of the G4. The 
current structure of the G4 is not congruent with the mission and does not support the 
vertical and lateral coordination and mutual adjustments required for efficient logistics 
operations. There are two possible options for structural change: 
The structure could be decentralized and directed toward the Army's mission, so 
that the Army could directly manage its activities enabling it to prioritize and monitor its 
logistics process. Thus the G4 would be more directly involved and responsible in the 
planning, programming, budgeting, and contracting activities of the Army which are 
currently centralized in the Ministry of Defense. Most important, the new structure would 
clarify the relations between the G4 and the Ministry of Defense departments, which 
currently overload the G4 with more and more responsibilities that slow down logistics 
operations, create conflict in roles and responsibilities, and lead to poor accountability. 
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This recommendation requires the Ministry of Defense to strengthen the logistics support 
departments in the ministry so that they can facilitate other service's logistics units. 
Alternatively the structure could be centralized. A Ministry of Defense logistics 
service could be designed to centrally serve all military services. This defense logistics 
service would be responsible for general military logistics and defense contracts, policy- 
making and long-range planning. This option would require that each service have its 
logistic sub-unit with a direct functional link to the defense logistics service. The option 
could enhance integration of logistics activities in the military and allow more 
coordination of logistics policies and operations between the ministry and the services. 
Centralization also would ease the otherwise fragmented and poorly coordinated 
acquisition and budgeting activities. This alternative calls for a smaller G4, narrowly 
focussed on serving the army, but closely coordinating with the ministry logistics 
department. 
With the initiation of a strategic planning effort other structures could be 
suggested, evaluated, and discussed basing on past experiences and future projections. 
Ultimately the goal would be to adopt a more workable and efficient structure for the 
logistics service that is congruent with G4 direction and mandate. 
c) Human Resource Management 
Possibilities of hiring civilians to resolve the skill deficiency should be 
considered. After all there are many skilled unemployed people who would be happy to 
get jobs. 
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Personnel and training. G4 should seriously consider setting up a 
customized logistics-training program to equip logistics employees from various 
backgrounds with the relevant and necessary skills to perform G4 tasks. The primary 
function would be to initiate a critical training program, make use of lessons learned, and 
reward the desired behaviors. Furthermore, G4 leadership coordinating with G1 should 
actively be involved in the selection process to ensure possible job matches under the 
current personnel system. 
a Rewards. The traditional reward system should be updated to motivate 
desired conduct and behaviors. Effective and innovative ways to motivate and reward 
excellence in performance for individual and groups should be part of the army G1 and 
the G4 particularly. This would require assessing what members of the organization value 
by asking them or by borrowing alternatives fiom other organizations with the 




Financial Management, Budgeting, Accountability, and 
By starting the planning process with a mission statement, G4 leaders and 
Army leadership can begin to focus the limited organizational resources on the most 
critical needs of the Army. It is always true that more achievement comes from doing a 
few things well. Therefore G4 needs to identify its priority tasks and devote its available 
resources to carrying them out. The organization should emphasize cost accounting to 
improve financial management. 
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3. Culture 
G4 should consider developing through its direction setting and design factors a 
culture that is favorable to organizational learning. This can be done by rewarding 
innovative behavior, learning from past experiences, encouraging people to take initiative 
so as to contribute to organization improvement. G4 should emphasize planning and 
visions instead of "quick fix" actions. Organizational members should be allowed to take 
some risks for the purpose of seeking ways for improving G4 operations because 
innovation always carries the risk of failure. 
4. outputs 
The G4 has a few, if any, actual measures of performance. To improve 
performance or productivity requires defining what is it that the G4 is supposed to do and 
then measuring it. The more employees perceive that an activity is measured, they are 
likely to devote more effort to the activity. G4 managers should work to establish 
performance measures for the organization's goals and if possible should involve as many 
organization employees as possible. Practice in creating metrics for output evaluation 
could be documented and incorporated into the G4 personnel training and orientation 
programs. The nature of the measure is not nearly as important as the fact that a measure 
is selected, communicated, and monitored. 
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G. SUMMARY 
Given the current environment in which the G4 operates, it is crucial that several 
issues raised in this thesis be critically examined and addressed if the organization is to be 
transformed into an efficient and effective organ of the Army. 
Although there is acute shortage of resources, critical re-evaluation is called for to set 
new direction, restructure the organization to fit the new mission, initiate a strategic 
planning hc t ion ,  and refocus organizational energy and resources to priority programs. 
These efforts should link with objective measures and indicators to give leaders and 
managers some indication whether their organization is really progressing and improving 
its performance. 
Some recommendations, for example those related to human resource management, 
will require broader system wide intervention because they fall outside the G4 domain. 
Hence support from Army leadership and the Minister of Defense will be necessary for the 
changes to be successfblly implemented. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTED AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION , 
This thesis describes the G4 organization from an overall systems perspective and 
makes recommendations to improve performance. An important step in any change 
process is to understand how various organizational inputs and design factors can be 
altered to achieve desired results. Military leaders seeking organizational improvements 
must first have a clear picture of all major systems components in order to know where 
and how to intervene. 
The thesis was intended to answer the following questions: 
0 What is the nature of G4's current operations, in terms of its direction, design 
features, and results? 
How well is the organization fhctioning or performing? 
What can be done to improve performance? 
0 
The thesis shows that G4 is currently operating in a very dynamic and uncertain 
environment faced with competing demands amidst acute budgetary constraints. This is 
M h e r  compounded by the organization's lack of clear direction. All these have led G4 to 
become a responsive organization operating in a reactive rather. than a pro-active mode. 
G4 operations mainly involve simple and routine technology, with primary tasks 
programmed and standardized except for a few activities like preparing force 
requirements and acquisition processing which are more complex and require technical 
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skills. The organization's operations are basically short-term focussed mainly on routine 
administrative work with virtually no long-term operational plans for essential 
operational and management tasks. 
G4 structure is both functional and matrix at different levels. However, G4 is 
currently involved in far more activities than what it is formally mandated. The extra 
responsibilities are an overload to the G4 structure. 
The organization has energetic and loyal employees, but they are not adequate 
both in number and skill levels. Staffing is still haphazard except for the three top 
positions. Personnel matters for the Army are centrally managed by the G1 service. The 
Army still lacks mechanisms of addressing personnel issues and therefore organizational 
and individual personnel expectations are still unresolved. 
Financial management, measurement and control, and planning functions are 
either lacking or are primarily short-term focussed and used for internal evaluation and 
assessment where they exist. G4 gathers and maintains large amounts of information on 
logistics operations but it is not used for operations improvement. 
G4 has a crisis management culture responding to emergent issues, there is strong 
fear for change mainly because failure is discouraged and is often punishable. 
Nonetheless, G4 employees are loyal to the organization and committed to work. they 
have close ties, mainly associating according to fhctions and specialties. 
The organization generally lacks objective measures of performance, but there is 
limited evaluation based on: feedback from the ground forces, inventory levels, and cost 
savings more especially from improved acquisition procedures or better distribution 
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networks and stocks management. Performance evaluation is still primarily based on 
intuition, hearsay, and value judgment. 
Regarding how well the organization is currently hctioning, the analysis shows a 
seriously resource constrained G4 which lacks a clear mandate and mission. The 
organization is tasked with doing everything without the necessary means and direction. 
Despite the challenges and unfavorable external environment, G4 has served the Defense 
Ministry in general and the Army in particular since its inception in 1995. 
It is clear from the description and analysis of the organization, that a lot has to be 
done to improve operations of the G4. Currently, it lacks direction and the necessary 
resources to make it an efficient agency. Therefore it has turned into a "firefighting" unit, 
tending to do everything at the same time. 
Lack of direction offsets concentration on primary mission and renders the G4 a 
mediocre organization at best, especially in the long run. There are a number of 
irregularities in the design factors, which limit G4's capacity to operate efficiently, and 
these include concentrating on administrative work with limited time to attend to 
essential operational and management tasks. 
The structure does not fit the extra responsibilities imposed on the organization. 
The lack of fit results in confusion, conflict, and exhaustion of employees and wastes 
resources. Furthermore the current structure isolates the G4 from the important roles of 
budgeting, planning, forecasting and contracting for the Army; these functions are 
currently centralized at the Ministry of Defense level. Lack of fit in the G4 structure is 
responsible for malhctions in operations, accountability and responsibility. 
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Absence of formal mechanisms to address personnel matters, scarcity of 
employees and skill levels reduce operational efficiency. This is further worsened by a 
lack of satisfactory rewards to employees. Hence, motivation and productivity are eroded. 
In terms of financial management, controls, and planning. The Army's limited 
participation in the budgeting and contracting roles reduces the G4's ability to prepare any 
functional plans. Budgeting and contracting are centralized in the Ministy of Defense. 
Decision-making and communication is mainly top down, which portrays limited 
decision-making at lower levels and limited use of feedback loops. This situation reduces 
exchanges that would improve operations. The only exception is at lower levels where 
technicians have authority over their tasks and often advise directors and G4 on technical 
matters. Information gathered on logistics operations is not effectively used for decision 
making support and improvement in operations. The communication gap results into 
faulty decisions in logistics operations. 
The quick fix and results oriented culture although a great asset in the short-term, 
is a liability to the long-term perspective of the G4 because it blinds the organization fiom 
properly forecasting the future, and discourages innovation. 
The G4 has served the the Defense Ministry for the past six years and has enabled 
the Army to accomplish significant operational results. Despite the achievements, there is 
still room to improve the logistics operations to achieve far better results. Although it is 
not easy to measure current efficiency levels given that what constitutes a basis for 
evaluations is virtually lacking, there is little question that design misfits exist and need to 
be addressed to improve organizational performance. 
82 
Analyzing the organizations' context, strategy, design elements, culture, outputs, 
and outcomes, reveals that G4 exists in a very dynamic, complex and uncertain 
environment. Its direction and mission are not clear and the system design elements do 
not appear to be aligned with strategy. Hence, a major conclusion of the study is that G4 
must address issues surrounding its mandate, mission, and design if it is to improve its 
performance. Suggested actions to improve performance include: 
a Clearly define the G4 mandate and mission and clarify its relationship with 
the Ministry of Defense. This action requires active involvement of senior Defense and 
Army leadership. 
a Establish a strategic planning process for G4. The process should include 
the assessment of the external and internal operating environments, the setting of 
direction and the implementation and evaluation of short-term and long-term plans, and 
the measurement of results. 
a Identify G4 core tasks and separate them from non-essential activities. 
Focus resources on core issues, reduce redundancies, and pull resources from processes 
that do not add value to the organization and direct them to crucial task areas. 
a Consider developing a planning, programming, and budgeting process that 
links military requirements to funded programs. 
a Develop measures of performance using and linking them to the 
organization's direction. Increase visibility of how costs are linked to performance. 
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0 Establish a G4 operating philosophy based on assessment of the external 
and internal operating environments, clear goals, and implementation and evaluation of 
short-term and long-term results. 
B. AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY 
More detailed research is required in the following areas for the Army and the 
Ministry of Defense to realize long-term development and success of the logistics 
function: 
1. Examine how a defense-wide organizational assessment can be conducted 
to determine the necessary changes for improving the service's logistics units and the 
entire defense logistics system. A system-wide assessment would stimulate more 
comprehensive revisions of the current structures and potentially lead to improvements in 
G4 operations. 
2. Implement organization assessment on a continuous basis in the logistics 
services to incorporate lessons learned and to make changes based on rational assessment. 
3. Introduce information and communications technology into G4 to improve 
logistics operations. 
4. Create a long-term vision for the G4 that is both attainable and inspiring to 
personnel. 
5 .  Project a long-term shape and size of the Rwandese military that could be 
implemented when normalcy is attained. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
These recommendations are intended for discussion among G4 strategic planning 
team members. They can be used as starting points for considering fundamental 
organizational change. It is clearly up to the Army senior leadership to provide the 
strategy, direction, communication, and necessary resources to effect the needed changes. 
Current inefficiencies in G4 operations can and must be improved upon if the 
organization is to successfully adapt to a fast changing world. 
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APPENDIX (A) 
Extra responsibilities of the G4 
Responsibilities the G4 shares with other departments in the Ministry of Defense 
and other Military Services. (These are over and above the oficial mandate of the G4) 
Figure 3.0 shows the defense logistics system, all ministry departments 
responsible for logistics, and the position of the G4 in the whole defense logistics 
network. A description of the army G4 cannot be complete without mentioning all it does 
beyond its official mandate. In addition to what the unit is formally required to do, the G4 
also carries out other functions as “implicitly” mandated by the Ministry of Defense. It 
serves all the military and the ministry headquarters with the general logistical 
requirements, which include, transport requirements, maintenance and repair service, fuel 
and lubricants, material supplies, storage facilities, and construction services. All defense 
departments still depend on the existing facilities and infrastructure, which is managed by 
the Army G4 on behalf of all the services. 
The G4 service provides the ground infrastructure and depot facilities for storage 
and distribution of all logistical needs. All services and other logistics departments in the 
ministry that handle items and equipment like medicines and medical equipment, 
ammunitions and weaponry, and communication and telecommunications use the 
established Army infrastructure. All offices handling logistical issues at ministerial and 
other services level closely coordinate with the G4 in their operations because they cannot 
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operate without the ground infrastructure and distribution network of the army. Another 
important function of the G4 service is its coordination with the ministerial departments 
like medical, information technology and telecommunications, and the inspectorate of 
general military equipment (IGME) in distribution and delivery of the crucial services and 
materials provided by these departments to fighting units. 
All the mentioned departments with the exception of the Personnel Service form 
the bulk of the defense budget; hence, their coordination is important in the preparation of 
the defense budget. 
The G4 works closely with the Secretary General in the Ministry of Defense and 
Defense logistics departments of finance, medical, and general military equipment to 
coordinate all logistics operations. 
With the Secretary General and the finance directorate in the Ministry of Defense, 
the G4 plays a limited and an advisory role in issues pertaining to contract management. 
The G4 advises the Secretary General on requisition decisions (what to buy, how much, 
what quality, and when to buy). And the actual contract management remains a direct 
responsibility of the defense offices. 
G4 is a member of the Military Tender Board a committee that is responsible for 
contract initiation and evaluations chaired by the secretary general. The board is 
composed of directors of finance and planning, the chief of personnel in the army (Gl) 
and the G4 as permanent members and any other member from the departments 




A sample of the questions used in the interviews I had with logistics officials in 
the Ministry of Defense and the Army service. 
The first three questions were general and were intended to give a summary of the 
operational environment of the logistics service. The remaining questions were 














What are your objectives? 
What helps you achieve those objectives? 
What prevents you from accomplishing more? 
What is the purpose of your organization? 
What are the basic tasks of the organization? 
What specifications are required in carrying out these tasks? 
What are the interdependencies among the work units or activities in the 
What is the condition of the work facilities and equipment? 
What are the basic groupings of activities and people? 
How are the groupings integrated? And what are the integrating devices 




What knowledge, skills, and abilities do they have? 
How are resources (financial and material) controlled and measured? And 
how can you describe your organization's budgeting process? 
14. 
15. How is performance measured? 
How are people held accountable for resources? 
16. How does the organization recruit, select, retain, rotate, promote, 
terminate, and retire its employees? 
17. 
18. 
19. What is formally rewarded in the organization? And what other 
Does the organization have the kind of people it needs? 
How are employees trained and developed? 
compensation packages does the organization offer? 
20. How does the organization gather, process, distribute, and evaluate 
information? 
21. How does the organization plan, and how are decisions made in the 
organization? 
22. What are the formal and informal patterns of interaction in the 
organization? 
23. What does the organization produce or offer in terms of goods or services? 
24. How are these outputs measured and what are the indicators of 
performance? 
25. What are the implications or consequences of these outputs for the 
organization's stakeholders? 
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